The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything. ' (Schmitt 2005: 15) . This exceptional series of summits perfectly matches the exceptional nature of the European crisis, where the monetary union and the entire European integration process seemed already 'gripped with an existential crisis that is slowly, but inexorably, destroying' (de Grauwe 2013) their very foundations before the migration crisis and other recent developments explicitly added new dimensions to the political puzzle. But while Heads of State and Government have clearly proved that Europe's sovereignty ultimately belongs to them, they could not yet give a sustainable and structural solution to financial, economic, social, security and political worries about Eurozone unity, the future of the European Union (EU, the Union) and its geopolitical role in the world. This is true despite the fact that, on the one hand, macroeconomic fundamentals of the Euro area as a whole are still considerably better than those of the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Japan, and on the other hand, that the EU didn't exploit its enormous potential power yet in the fields of foreign, security and defence policies (besides, a single European defence would be extremely cost-effective, generating economies of scale and releasing resources for E -24 and social consequences. Eight years after the crisis began, no serious economic recovery is in sight for either the Euro area or the EU in general -whose growth prospects, that were remarkably peculiar in 2013 world context (see below, chart 2), remain all in all weak (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/update/01/) despite the efforts of the European Central Bank and the Junker Commission.
The European Council's (EC) right to rule can be perceived as an unavoidable consequence of the EU's institutional architecture, but its strikingly ineffective results have nonetheless allowed its paradoxical meaning to emerge: Europe's public good is ultimately defined and interpreted by the less accountable and less supranational of its institutions. This is not just a curious crisis side effect. The EC's supremacy is at the core of the crisis itself, a sort of preliminary condition for the currency union's vulnerability. Ironically enough, the Lisbon Treaty signing and its entry into force cover the exact period from the Global Financial Crisis to the specific European emergency with the Greek debt crisis and scandal.
That Treaty was supposed to close, for a long period, the permanent 'reforming process' dating back to the birth of the EU itself with the Maastricht Treaty. A few years and many failures later, the EC now has to acknowledge that deep Treaty changes are needed to structurally overcome the Eurozone crisis and save (making it 'genuine') the Economic and Monetary Union within the EU.
In this short paper, I draw on three main arguments against the mainstream approach to crisis management in Europe: firstly, I stress that this crisis is political rather than economic, both at the global and European level. The relevance of International Relations and power struggles to explain global monetary and financial instability today is largely underestimated. Secondly, I will point out that Europe as a whole is facing a hastened phase of a structural rather than episodic crisis, following the progressive shift of the world order from a bipolar toward a multi-polar system. Thirdly, I will stress that today's crisis in Europe has been long awaited rather than unexpected, since its origins trace back to a lack of reactivity of the European unification process to the progressive weakening of US hegemony in the world from 1971 onward.
I propose, on this basis, a significantly different criterion be used to draw a roadmap to genuinely achieve the European Monetary Union (EMU), as the roadmap included in the 'Five Presidents' Report' of June 2015 (Juncker 2015) will prove ineffective because it still relies on two double-binds that mutually prevent a full (and widespread) understanding of 
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Europe's situation: the 'sovereignty double-bind', following which sovereignty is either legitimate (national level) or effective (Europe); and the 'democracy double-bind', for which democracy should be either diminished (for the sake of effectiveness) or restored (for the sake of legitimacy). Europe's agenda toward its political unification should primarily aim at tackling these misrepresentations instead of embracing them by means of a gradualist approach to legitimacy issues. One may observe that while Europe's ruling class is by now fully aware of the fact that only European unity can save (national) democracy, there is still a dangerous lack of awareness about the inverse relation: only (supranational) democracy can save European unity, since this long-term, structural crisis is by now taking new shapes that are only apparently unconnected and is rapidly eroding the pro-European consensus all over the continent. Little more than three years is left for the European ruling class to fully involve European citizens in the unification process and the next step In other words, from a logical point of view, the public debate at all levels systematically reverses the cause-and-effect relation. It treats the crisis consequences as if they were its causes, very often completely overlooking the political side of the matter, like one could do with a minor detail or a taken-for-granted and unchangeable element of Presidents' Report' gives back supranational institutions a central role, but it falls short of the need to foster a debate on the 'vision of the whole structural solution'. This should be the role of the European Parliament and political groups. Despite its formal participation, the European Parliament will ultimately remain an object rather than a subject of reforming initiatives, in exactly the same way in which European citizens are regularly the object rather than the subject of the European integration process, until it will take a serious initiative on its own. Inter-institutional cooperation should not distract from the fact that the 'structural solution' for the euro area entails inter-institutional power struggles, since 'it does not seem possible to reconcile the institutional functioning of the EU with the principles of representative democracy except by a modification of the existing Treaties and the establishing of a European federal entity (not necessarily the presidential model of the US)' (Ponzano 2012).
This fundamental weakness not only accounts for the structural inefficiency of any EU plan to achieve an admittedly fake monetary union and fully overcome a crisis that is expanding today to the free movement right, but also explains why the sovereign debt crisis itself could burst forth. Twenty-four years ago, European leaders were confronted with a difficult choice. Two ways were available to achieve an Economic and Monetary Union: let's name them 'convergence through mutual and communitarian supervision' and 'convergence through a unique fiscal and economic policy' (that is to say a European federal government). Convergence through mutual and communitarian supervision (CMCS) was the predictable choice of the Heads of State and Government: it allowed the EC to fulfil its core mission, which is well digested in the maxim 'making Europe run with the hares and hunt with the hounds'. The 'hares' are the two centuries old identities and institutions of national (self-styled 'sovereign') democracies; while the 'hounds' are the increasingly needed identity and institutions of a multilevel, supranational, fully accountable 
E -28
for expansionary measures to be implemented by other Eurozone Member States, and stabilisation policy will prove sub-optimal' (Majocchi 2013).
Therefore, expansionary measures need to be truly European. In other words, this time the only possible way to overcome the crisis is to overtly grapple with the political and cultural problems that the evolution of the EMU toward a full federation inevitably brings about.
Long before today's emergency, it nonetheless had to be clear-at least since the 1970s and the end of the Bretton Woods system-that a sum of national behaviours does not equate a supranational behaviour, just like the sum of national public investments does not equate a European public investment: it is obviously a matter of economies of scale.
The CMCS method is basically wasteful and unfit to fully develop Europe's potentialities.
What inevitably becomes a problem, in front of an increasing number of compelling challenges simply incommensurable both with Nation-States and intergovernmental powers. Until the world order was guaranteed by a relatively stable system of continental states (the US and USSR, and the US alone after 1991), Europe could slowly upgrade to the economies of scale needed by an increasing global interdependence. The beginning of the XXI century has clearly shown that this stable framework has come to an end; the US alone cannot provide for a global order both in the security and economic domains. The Lehman Bros. collapse is symbolically akin to the collapse of the Twin Towers. A new multi-polar world is in the making, conflicts are less predictable, and global history has accelerated its rhythm. Europe must move faster towards the economies of scales it needs to actively take part in this history. 
Double-Binds
The building of European supranational institutions is traditionally interpreted as an injurious but sometimes necessary 'transfer of sovereignty' from the national to the European level. This is what I call the 'sovereignty double-bind', following which sovereignty is either legitimate (national level) or effective (Europe). But is this the only or best point of view from which to describe this process? As long as nationalist methodology is the undisputed reference frame of any scientific analysis, public debate and political approach to this question, the answer cannot be anything other than 'Yes'. Let's take global history as a frame of reference. There is no doubt in this case that European institutions mean a 'regain of sovereignty' for all European citizens, because their Nation-States and national societies are increasingly irrelevant in a world of continental states. From this perspective, the European integration process does no harm to national sovereignties, since they are doomed to disappear as long as they play at being self-sufficient in a globally 
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The problem lies in the expression 'first of all'. Individuals do not in principle, and should not in practice, belong 'first of all' to any specific group, because they statutorily belong 'at the same time' to an infinite number of groups, otherwise they would not be 'individuals' at all, i.e. irreducible to each other. It has been a specific feature of nationalist paradigms to nurture the illusion of a privileged membership. Now, the fact that we cannot rationally identify any 'absolute' reference frame does not mean that we do not have the right to assess which frames are 'better' and which are 'worse' in relation to specific objectives and value scales. Nor does it mean that we can ignore the role of history (i.e. past individual and collective experiences) in the selection and institutionalization of belongings. But that is exactly what is at stake in the European integration process: a historical negation of absolute belongings and their institutions, a first applied example of institution-building led by bi-directional subsidiarity. Concerning sovereignty, we should therefore compare multiple frames with multiple objectives in order to establish step by step a sort of ideal chart. We shall then compare such a chart with a similar EU chart, describing the actual situation for European citizens. We would see that the 'sovereignty double-bind' is nothing more than a nationalist misunderstanding, which plays against the best sovereignty distribution from the point of view of individuals' reference frames. Any national citizen of any European Member State cannot generally hope to be 'sovereign' without the full development of institutions that enable him/her to act as a European; for example, he/she cannot specifically and satisfactorily self-determine his/her life in security and economic matters.
The 'sovereignty double-bind' relies on a 'democracy double-bind'. Nationalist methodology, a way of conceiving our social life as if there could be any absolute reference frame, has accustomed us to think of democracy as if it could fully or primarily develop one level of our territorial belongings. From this perspective, the European integration process inevitably means that democracy should be either diminished (for the sake of effectiveness) or restored at the national level (for the sake of legitimacy). Even the great innovation of an elected European Parliament in 1979, and its increasing number of powers and competences during its first forty years of life, could not break up this idea.
With an inverse trend, the European elections turnout inexorably decreased over this Overcoming both double-binds I defined above is the main cultural challenge Europe must face if it is to survive its structural crisis: the Eurozone has naturally the biggest duties and interests from this point of view. Along with a fully bi-directional subsidiarity, a fully democratic system based on the division of powers is required at all institutional/territorial levels to guarantee effectiveness and legitimacy at the same time; in other words, that the best available means of empowering an individual's sovereignty in a globalized world have been put in place in the very continent that engendered the culture of absolute political divisions between human beings. This momentous shift in our traditional political paradigms cannot be divided into definite steps, nor can it be concealed under a plethora of technical solutions to short-term problems. It should explicitly inspire a genuine roadmap toward a European political union. A sound roadmap requires a shared view of its goals by the people who are supposed to draw and implement it. Euro Area 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 USA -2 -1.7 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
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